Abstract Many experiments have demonstrated the power of norm enforcementpeer monitoring and punishment-to maintain, or even increase, contributions in social dilemma settings, but little is known about the underlying norms that monitors use to make punishment decisions, either within or across groups. Using a large sample of experimental data, we empirically recover the set of norms used most often by monitors and show first that the decision to punish should be modeled separately from the decision of how much to punish. Second, we show that absolute norms often fit the data better than the group average norm often assumed in related work. Third, we find that different norms seem to influence the decisions about punishing violators inside and outside one's own group.
Introduction
There has recently been a lot of interest in the ability of punishment to regulate behavior in social dilemma settings, but the bulk of this work tends to focus on testing institutional boundaries and few papers examine the causes of punishment. 1 The notable exceptions are the neural studies of de Quervain et al. (2004) and Singer et al. (2006) , which indicate that people receive pleasure from punishing norm violators but even these studies do not tell us what sorts of "misbehavior" trigger punishment. What rule must be violated before someone punishes? And does the same rule determine both the likelihood of intervention and the level of punishment? We work towards answers to these questions by employing more traditional methods. Using a large sample of contribution and punishment decisions from public goods experiments and a novel econometric specification, we recover both the norms used to motivate the decision to punish and those that determine the level of chosen punishment.
The problem with the literature is not that the link between enforcement and some normative trigger has been ignored, but rather that the trigger has been assumed, not inferred. Many researchers assume that the salient triggering norm is the group average contribution to the public good: the more one contributes below (and possibly above) the group average, the more likely one is to be punished and the more punishment one receives. In the theoretical literature, Falkinger (1996 Falkinger ( , 2006 ) models tax and transfer policies around the group average that are to be implemented both decentrally and by a central authority. 2 Ever since its original invocation in Fehr and Gächter (2000) , lab studies have routinely used the group average as the reference norm when analyzing experimental data from the voluntary contribution mechanism. 3 Another contribution of this paper is the recovery of distinct second-party and third-party norms from our data. Second-party punishment occurs when one member of a group free rides and other "ingroup" members punish this person. Third-party punishment (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Carpenter and Matthews 2005) occurs when members of one group punish free riders in neighboring but otherwise disjoint groups. While second party punishers benefit in the long run if they can get free riders in their groups to contribute, third-party punishers can typically expect no material benefit to come from their sanctions and given the potential costs of such acts, it is not clear why anyone would intervene. 4 Although the logic of third-party punishment is not obvious, researchers have determined that it is crucial for the enforcement of social norms in large populations-second party punishment is often not enough (Bendor and Swistak 2001; Carpenter and Matthews 2008; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004) .
We are aware of no other studies that infer norms as we have done here, and certainly none that do so within a framework that allows for both second-and thirdparty punishment. One of our most important results is that we find surprisingly little evidence that (own) group average, the norm assumed in much of the experimental literature, drives either the decision to punish or, conditional on this, the level of punishment. Instead, we find that these decisions are separable and based on distinct norms, and that within group norms tend to be simple and absolute, while outgroup norms tend to be relative, with a possible role for intergroup rivalry. We describe our experiment in the next section and present an overview of the data in Sect. 3 before reporting on our analysis of the normative triggers for punishment in Sect. 4. We conclude by briefly organizing our results into three main themes in Sect. 5.
A norm enforcement experiment
While our design is based on the standard voluntary contribution mechanism originally used in Isaac et al. (1984) , we allow players to freely monitor the decisions made by other players and to punish them at a cost. We recruited a large sample of 276 participants at Middlebury College in 34 experimental sessions. The participants were randomly assigned to 69 four-person groups, with two groups, or eight participants, per session. The experiment lasted for ten periods, participants remained in the same group for all ten periods (i.e., the partners treatment), and both of these features were common knowledge. Participants earned an average of $16.84 including a $5 show-up fee and a typical session lasted slightly less than an hour.
There were four treatments: a replication of the standard voluntary contribution game (VCM) which we use as a control on our procedures (14 groups), a replication of previous mutual monitoring experiments (MM) in which players could monitor all other players but punish just the other members of their group (11 groups), and two outgroup treatments in which players could monitor and punish all the other players, regardless of their group. In the Two Way outgroup treatment (26 groups) players contributed to a public good that only benefited the four people in the group but could monitor and punish any of the other people in the session including the four people in the other group. The One Way treatment (18 groups) was identical to the Two Way treatment except that only one of the two groups in a session could monitor and punish participants in the other group.
The purpose of having two outgroup treatments was to control for any possibility of reciprocity between the groups as a motivation for punishment. In the Two Way treatment, members of one group might engage in more outgroup punishment if they expect the other group to reciprocate the third-party monitoring (Carpenter and Matthews 2005) . If this occurs and has some impact on the underlying norm that triggers punishment, we want to identify the change and can do so with the One Way treatment. In the One Way treatment, reciprocity is precluded because only one group can punish outgroup and therefore the treatment provides the cleanest demonstration of third-party intervention.
The payoff function for the experiment was similar to the mutual monitoring incentive structure (see ), but we augmented it to account for out-group punishment. Punishment was costly; players paid one experimental monetary unit (EMU) to reduce the gross earnings of another player by two EMUs. 5 Imagine n players divided equally into g groups, each of whom can contribute any fraction of their w EMU endowment to a public good, keeping the rest. Say player i in group g contributes c g i to the public good the benefits of which are shared only by members of group g, and keeps w − c g i . Each player's contribution is revealed to all the other players in the session, who then can punish other players at a cost of 1 EMU per sanction. Let s ij be the expenditure on sanctions assigned by player i to player j (we force s ii = 0). Then the stage payoff to player i in group g is:
is the total contribution in group g, j =i,i∈g s ij is player i's expenditure on ingroup sanctions, j =i,i / ∈g s ij is player i's expenditure on outgroup sanctions and 2 j =i s ji is the reduction in i's payoff due to the total sanctions received from the rest of the players in both groups. The variable m is the marginal per capita return on a contribution to the public good (see Ledyard 1995) . In all sessions m was set to 0.5 and w was set to 25 EMUs.
With m = 0.5, the dominant strategy is to free ride on the contributions of the rest of one's group (i.e. c g i = 0 for all i) because each contributed EMU returns only 0.5 to the contributor. Also notice that if everyone in a four-person group contributes one EMU, they all receive a return of 2 EMUs from the public good. If individual preferences are purely self-regarding, these incentives constitute a social dilemma, with group incentives at odds with individual incentives. The situation becomes more complicated, of course, if individuals are assumed to have social preferences of one sort or another: under some conditions, positive contributions and sanctions can be rationalized as strategic equilibria, as in Fehr and Gächter (2000) .
Because sanctions are costly to impose and their benefit cannot be fully internalized (ingroup) or cannot be internalized at all (outgroup) by the punisher, the threat to punish is an incredible one and cannot be part of any subgame perfect equilibrium. Indeed, the only subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is one in which everyone free rides and nobody punishes.
Each session lasted ten periods and each period had three stages which proceeded as follows. 6 In stage one players contributed any fraction of their 25 EMU endowment in whole EMUs to the public good. The group total contribution was calculated and reported to each player along with his or her gross payoff. Participants were then shown the contribution decisions of all the other players in their group (mutual monitoring) or in the session (outgroup). Players anonymously imposed sanctions by typing the number of EMUs they wished to spend to punish an individual in the textbox below that player's decision. After all players were done distributing sanctions, the experiment moved to stage three where everyone was shown an itemized summary of their net payoff (gross payoff minus punishment dealt minus punishment received) for the period. 
Data overview
Before turning to the core of our analysis, the estimation of punishment norms, a brief overview of our contribution and punishment data is warranted. Table 1 lists summary statistics for the experiment by treatment. Mean contributions vary from a low of 10.65 (43% of the endowment) in the VCM replication to 16.14 (65%) in the MM treatment. Consistent with most other mutual monitoring studies (e.g., Gächter 2000 or Masclet et al. 2003) , second-party punishment increases individual contributions significantly (z = 8.91, p < 0.01). 7 We also see that the combination of second-party and third-party punishment also increases contributions. The mean of 12.45 in the One Way treatment represents a significant increase over the VCM (z = 4.44, p < 0.01), as does the mean contribution of 15.67 in the Two Way treatment (z = 10.33, p < 0.01). The One Way treatment, however, does not appear to do as well as either the MM or Two Way treatments (One Way vs MM: z = 7.44, p < 0.01; One Way vs. Two Way: z = 8.28, p < 0.01). 8 Although contributions are not our immediate focus in this paper, we were initially surprised to find that the Two Way did not do better than the MM, but attribute this, for reasons described in more detail in the next section, to group rivalry.
To get a sense of the dynamics of contributions, Fig. 1 plots the time series for each treatment. As is now typical in this literature, punishment tends to stabilize contributions. While Fehr and Gächter (2000) report significant increases, most studies (e.g., Masclet et al. 2003 or Carpenter 2007a ) report relatively flat contributions over time. 9 We also see the small dip in contributions at the end of the game that is common in this literature. Consistent with Table 1 , the MM and Two Way treatments elicit higher contributions from the start of the experiment. We also see that the One Way treatment only begins to show higher contributions after the fourth round of play and the VCM demonstrates a slow decline from contributions near half the endowment in period 1 to contributions near a quarter in the last round. 7 We report the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum statistic. 8 In an expanded one-shot version of this experiment, Carpenter and Matthews (2005) find contributions to be higher in the One Way treatment than in the Two Way treatment. 9 The extent to which punishment affects contributions is determined partially by the cost of punishment. In our experiment the cost per sanction was relatively high, 1 for 2. In other experiments higher levels of contributions have been achieved with cheaper punishment. See Casari (2005) , Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) or Egas and Riedl (2008) .
Fig. 1 Contribution time series
Concerning punishment, it appears, based on the data in Table 1 , that the likelihood with which a participant will sanction one of her teammates is similar across the three treatments that allow punishment: slightly more than a third of the participants punish. Indeed, none of the three proportions tests yielded significant results. Likewise, the overall punishment expenditures do not appear to be significantly different across treatments. Participants tend to spend an average of about 1.5 EMUs on punishment per round. Of course this average is low because most of the observations are zeros. Conditional on punishment, the average rises to 4.37 EMUs. We find it interesting that players tend to spend the same amount on punishment in each of the treatments and that they devote about half of their resources to punishing outside their groups in the outgroup treatments. 10 At first blush, the fact that people tend to spend about the same amount on punishment might make one think that the contribution norms are independent of the treatments, but as we show in the next section, this is not the case.
What triggers norm enforcement?
Four principles informed our recovery of the norms used by participants to guide their punishment decisions. First, because we suspected that for most individuals, the decisions whether or not to punish and how much to punish were not just two sides of the same coin, we concluded that the tobit model and its variants, a common framework in the literature, would be too restrictive. Indeed, one of the novel possibilities we wished to consider was whether these decisions were based on different norms.
Second, we did not assume, as much, if not all, of the empirical literature does, that the relevant norm for either decision is the "own group average." Our motivation, however, was not to marshal evidence in favor of some preferred alternative, but rather to confront the data with a broad, if not exhaustive, set of alternatives, and discover which fits the observed behavior of our subjects best.
Third, because we were also interested in the persistence of norm enforcement, both decisions were also allowed to depend on the extent of norm violation in the previous round.
Last but not least, there is one sense in which our framework is more restrictive than much of the literature: we assume that the likelihood of sanctions and the amount spent on punishment are continuous at their respective norms. In other words, we want to rule out cases in which, for example, the sanctions imposed on someone who contributed a little less than the norm are predicted to be much different than those on someone who contributed a little more. To this end, we used bilinear splines (Poirier 1975) to model both decisions. 11 In this case, the "bi" prefix refers to the fact that we spline on one's deviation from the tested norm and the lag of one's deviation from the group average contribution.
In retrospect, the four principles seem sensible ones. As we shall soon show, for example, punishment is perhaps best treated as the result of two distinct decisions made under the influence of two distinct norms, neither of which is the own group average.
Our basic econometric framework is:
where (a) + = max[a, 0], v ij t is an indicator that subject i punished subject j in round t, p ij t is how much i spent to punish j in t, c jt is how much j contributed in t,c g j t−1 is the mean contribution of j 's group in t − 1, γ p t and γ v t are the (to be determined) contribution norms in t, and μ i and η i are unobserved individual effects. It assumes that without the information required to follow individual behavior from one round to the next, it is the representative, or mean, contribution of the target group that influences punishment in the current round.
Because it is reasonable to suppose that the unobserved sources of variation in norm enforcement will be uncorrelated with the contribution choices of others, μ i and η i can be treated as uncorrelated (that is, random) effects. It would be unreasonable to assume a priori, however, that the decision to punish is unrelated to the idiosyncratic shock e ij t , that is, to rule out selection effects. We therefore implement a version of the test described in Nijman and Verbeek (1992) , one that exploits the panel structure of our data or, to be more precise, the correlation of the punishment indicator across rounds. In particular, if the indicator for the previous round, v ij t−1 , is incorporated into the expenditure or level equation, then under the null of no selection effect, its estimated coefficient will be insignificant under a standard t-test.
There are two unusual, and context-specific, complications to consider, however. First, because subjects could not track one another from one round to the next, it made little (behavioral) sense to match the multiple punishment choices of each subject in the current round p ij t with the indicators for the previous round v ij t−1 . The problem is not as serious as first seems, however: since v ij t−1 and v ikt−1 must themselves be correlated, such matches are not essential. On the other hand, if the modified test is to be persuasive, the results should not be sensitive to the choices of j and k.
Second, because the contribution norm γ p t is unknown, the test statistics are also conditional on its definition. With more than a dozen norms under consideration, it is at least possible, then, that the test results will differ across norms, with uncertain implications.
As it turns out, however, our results are quite robust. In particular, there is little evidence of a selection effect, across treatments or norms. In other results available upon request, for example, we report test regressions and the coefficient on the last round indicator is never significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, a comparison with the reported results indicates that its inclusion has little effect on the other coefficient estimates. In other words we find that norm enforcement comprises two separate decisions, first, whether or not to punish, and second, if so, how much to punish. The immediate practical benefit of this result is that it allows the parameters [α 0 , . . . , α 7 ] and [β 0 , . . . , β 7 ] to be estimated separately.
We allow fourteen different norms to go "head-to-head." The first of these was the fixed or absolute norm γ v t = γ v t−1 = k, where k is some integer between 0 and 25 chosen on the basis of a grid search. 12 The second, the punisher's own contribution, was the most relative of the norms we considered and, a priori, we did not expect either to fit the data all that well. Between these two extremes were twelve norms defined in terms of group behavior, including, of course, the average contribution of group members. But which group? Do ingroup members judge outgroup contributions relative to their own (in)group or to the outgroup or both? Because few experimental studies of norm enforcement concern third party punishment, these questions are seldom asked. But to the extent that social norms require the involvement of third parties, it matters, for example, whether the norms are not just relative, but local (Bendor and Swistak 2001) . It is for this reason that we consider not one but three average norms: own group, target group and session.
Even if norms are defined in terms of central tendency, it is not obvious that the mean is the appropriate measure. Cinyabuguma et al. (2006) , for example, have coined the phrase "perverse punishment" to describe the ingroup sanctions that are sometimes imposed on those who contribute more than the group average, but consider a situation in which the four members of a group contribute 0, 18, 25 and 25 to the public good. If those who contribute 25 then punish the individual who contributes 18, it is not clear how, even within this framework, the sanctions are perverse. From a broader perspective, if it is the "representative contribution" that determines the norm, then it is at least plausible that individuals measure violations in terms of deviation from the median, not mean. To this end, the next three norms we considered were the own group, target group and session medians. Sugden's (1984) principle of reciprocity, on the other hand, implies that the search should not be limited to measures of central tendency. To paraphrase, it asserts that each individual ought to contribute at least as much as the minimum of all others in the relevant group, unless she believes that all should contribute some amount less than this. This is, in effect, a conditional version of the Kantian rule, approximated here by a norm that is equal to the ex post minimum over all group contributions, where, as before, we consider three (own, target, session) alternative definitions of group. Last, for reasons of both substance and symmetry, we also include models in which it is the maximum contribution that determines the norm. Table 2 summarizes the full set of norms that we examined. Because it was also presumptuous to insist that the decisions to punish "insiders" and "outsiders"-or, for that matter, outsiders in the One and Two Way treatments-were based on the same norm, we estimated separate models for each of these subsamples and, in each case, with and without the last round, however the last difference did not seem to matter Session Average Contribute at least as much as the session average.
Median
Contribute at least as much as the session median.
Minimum
Contribute at least as much as the session minimum.
Maximum
Contribute at least as much as the session maximum.
Outgroup Average Contribute at least as much as the other group's average.
Median
Contribute at least as much as the other group's median.
Minimum
Contribute at least as much as the other group's minimum.
Maximum
Contribute at least as much as the other group's maximum.
Absolute norm Contribute at least x where are x ∈ [0, 25]. Notes: All models estimated with random effects; (The best performing absolute norm); Best performing norm indicated by * much so we only present results from the full data set. 13 We use a simple metric to establish which norm fits the data best: which specification results in the highest log likelihood?
Ingroup punishment decisions
We focus first on the more familiar case of ingroup punishment. The first two columns in Table 3 report the log likelihoods for all ingroup norms when the decision to punish is estimated as a random effects probit and the decision of how much to punish is a random effects GLS that only uses the observations where p ij t > 0. Beginning with the decision of whether or not to intervene, to our initial surprise, the absolute norm won the "horse race," so easily, in fact, that we shall not devote much attention to the common runner up, the session minimum. Inasmuch as the difference between "place" and "show" was also substantial, it should be noted that the session minimum is a relative, but not local, norm, and is consistent with Sugden (1984) . Furthemore, the norm that best fits the data is γ v t = γ v t−1 = 24, that is, one that is almost equal to the entire endowment. 14 As for the level of punishment, analyzed in the second column of Table 3 , another absolute norm, contribute 9 EMUs or a little less than half the endowment, fit the data best, with the caveat that this race was substantially tighter: other norms like the median and mean of the punisher's own group also fit relatively well.
In Figs. 2 and 3 , we use the actual punishment data to plot, respectively, the probability of punishment and mean conditional punishment against the target's deviation from the relevant maximum likelihood maximizing norm. We also split both figures into an upper panel, which presents the data from groups that perform poorly-that is, groups with a low average or representative contribution in the previous roundand a lower panel for groups that perform well. These diagrams provide both some intuition for, and a check on the bilinear spline specification, the comparative statics of which are sometimes difficult to visualize.
For example, Fig. 2 indicates that if the target gives less than the norm, the ingroup punisher is less likely to punish him the more he gives, no matter how much his group gave last period. It also reveals, however, that if the target contributes more than the norm, the punisher is more likely to punish him the more he gives, but only in groups with low average contributions. This is consistent with the coefficient estimates in the first column of Table 4 . The first (−0.142) and fourth (+0.003) significant coef-14 As one reviewer notes, this is one of the most provocative results in the paper, in part because the mean contribution level in the MM treatment is much less than this. Future research should include at least two robustness checks. First, to what extent does this reflect our reliance on a "partners design"? Second, do similar results obtain for different subject pools? It's possible, for example, that different subjects use different absolute, or even local, norms within groups. Absolute (24) Absolute ( Notes: Standard errors in square brackets. One, two and three stars denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels ficients, for example, on c jt and c jtcg j t−1 , tell us that when the target's contribution falls below the critical threshold of 24 EMUs, the likelihood of punishment increases with the distance below the threshold and, mildly, with group generosity. On the other hand, the third (+4.047) and fifth (−0.246) significant coefficients, on (c jt − γ v t ) + and (c jt − γ v t ) +c g j t−1 tell us that, in addition, someone who contributes their entire endowment of 25 EMUs is more likely to be punished, but that this sanction is less likely to be imposed in more generous groups.
In contrast, the first column in Fig. 3 hints that the choice of punishment levels within groups is much less interesting: there isn't much variation in punishment by the extent of norm violation, and some evidence that more generous groups also spend more on punishment. This is consistent with both the closeness of the initial "norms race" and the small number of statistically significant coefficients in the second column of Table 4 , the most salient of which is the coefficient (0.456) onc g j t−1 .
Outgroup punishment decisions
The last four columns of log likelihoods in Table 3 suggest that as members consider behavior outside their own groups, it is the violation of relative, not absolute, norms that drives punishment. In the One Way treatment, for example, it is the session median that best explains the decision to punish and another session-level statistic, the average of all participants' contributions, that best explains the amount of punishment. A brief glance at the second column in Fig. 2 further hints that in the One Way treatment, the likelihood of outgroup punishment declines as the target's contribution increases, both when the representative outgroup member has been generous and when he has not, but increases, a little, in less generous groups when the target's current contribution exceeds the session median norm. This is more or less consistent with the econometric results in the third column of Table 4 . The observation that with the exception of the now positive coefficient (+0.038) on the (c jt − γ v t ) +c g j t−1 , none of the coefficients on variables that involve (c jt − γ v t ) + are significant tells us, for example, the v-shape that characterizes punishment probabilities within groups is absent in the One Way treatment. In fact, it further implies that instead of a "flattened v" as group average contribution rises, one way outgroup punishment exhibits the opposite comparative static, namely, an almost monotonically decreasing likelihood of punishment function that becomes more, not less, v-shaped as mean contribution rises.
In contrast to the data on incidence, the second column of Fig. 3 seems consistent with the existence of a pronounced v-shape in One Way punishment levels. We suspect this is an artifact of the relatively coarse classification of norm violations, however. Neither the coefficient on c jt nor that on (c jt − γ v t ) + reported in Table 4 is statistically significant. Our econometric results-in particular, the significant negative coefficient on (c g j t−1 − γ v t−1 ) + -also imply that outgroup punishment in the One Way treatment tends to decrease as the target's group becomes more generous, another feature not easily discerned in Fig. 3 .
Outgroup punishment in the Two Way treatment reflects the application of different norms than the One Way but, as Figs. 2 and 3 suggest, otherwise exhibits many of the same patterns. We first note that decision to punish outgroup members in the Two Way treatment is the only case in which the inferred norm is own group average, the default specification in most of the literature. This said, the session median "wins the race" for the norm that explains the amount of punishment inflicted.
The second and third columns in Fig. 2 show that although the norms themselves are different, the shapes of the likelihood of punishment functions are similar in the One and Two Way treatments: if anything, the Two Way pattern appears to be a more pronounced version of the One Way. The probit results reported in the fifth column of Table 4 support this view. In particular, the likelihood of punishment decreases as the target contributes more, conditional on the generosity of the entire group. If the target contributes less than the norm, the punisher is less likely to intervene as contributions rise in less generous groups, and no more or less likely to intervene in more generous groups. If, on the other hand, the target contributes more than the norm, the punisher is more likely to punish him, but only if the group was generous. Strikingly, the last column of Fig. 3 is almost a mirror image of the second column, suggesting that, conditional on the different norms at work and the decision to punish, the level of punishment associated with particular norm violations are quite similar. This is consistent with the econometric results in the last column of Table 4 . Ostentatious contributors in poorly performing groups are punished severely by outsiders, but this effect is dramatically attenuated in generous groups.
Concluding remarks
Overall, we find considerable diversity in the inferred norms driving punishment behavior in social dilemma experiments. That said, some themes have emerged. It appears, for example, that while punishment decisions in-and outside groups are driven by different norms, the norms in our two outgroup treatments are similar. Inside groups, punishers tend to use simple absolute rules to determine violations while they are more circumspect when considering violations in other groups. Here, relative norms seem to be more important.
Our econometric specification highlights two dimensions on which punishment decisions are made: contribution deviations of the target and the generosity of the target's group. It is interesting to conjecture about what the shapes of the punishment functions might be telling us. Consistent with what we found in a one-shot environment (Carpenter and Matthews 2005) , the v-shaped pattern of ingroup punishment might be consistent with conformity. Here both free riders and ostentatious contributors are disciplined. However, as we have seen this pattern changes when the groups become more generous. In this case, downward sloping functions are more consistent with promoting efficiency. These patterns are more interesting in the outgroup data because they tend to be the opposite of what we find in the ingroup data. Here groups that are not doing well benefit from downward sloping, efficiency enhancing punishment choices, but, curiously, the punishment tends to shift more towards higher than normal contributors when the target groups are doing better. Could this be evidence of inter-group competition? When punishers look at targets in the other group they might want to help the group if it is doing relatively poorly, but they might also want to try to sabotage it when it is doing really well.
Three other themes emerge from our work. First, we find that the decision to sanction someone else is separable from the (conditional) decision about the level of sanctions. In this context, we would conjecture that neurological evidence (de Quervain et al. 2004; Singer et al. 2006 ) that norm enforcement is "pleasurable" concerns the first decision more than the second, but this is a matter for future research. In broader terms, if norm enforcement embodies the "action tendencies" of several different emotions, there is much to learn about their respective roles.
Second, there is, at best, limited evidence that the norm often assumed to drive both decisions-that is, the local or own group average-is responsible for either, a result that, if robust, has serious implications for the interpretation of experimental data on sanctions and rewards. This seems even more important given recent crosscultural research that shows that these norms may vary by location (Henrich et al. 2006; Herrmann et al. 2008 ). While the method described herein is useful, especially given these differences by subject pool, we do not pretend, of course, that our identification of alternative norms is definitive, and perceive at least two directions for future research. The first, parametric, approach would post some "universal norm" as the convex combination of a small number of the norms considered here-one absolute and one relative, for example-and then calculate maximum likelihood weights for either or both decisions, within and across groups. A second, more ambitious, approach would attempt to achieve identification through experimental design, and we look forward to learning how other researchers do so.
Third, if, as expected, fewer and smaller sanctions are imposed on the members of other groups, there is also some evidence that the reasons for their imposition differ, too. That is, the punishment inflicted on outsiders is not just a muted version of that sometimes imposed on insiders. To the extent that the adoption of social norms is predicated on third party punishment, the emphasis on second party punishment in the literature seems misplaced.
